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As the Immigration Act 20141 neared the end of its passage through Parliament, the Joint 
Committee on Human Rights affirmed2 its previously expressed concern3 that what is now 
section 19 of that Act was ‘a significant, and possibly unprecedented trespass by the 
legislature into the judicial function’.4 Section 19 insets a new Part 5A headed ‘Article 8 of 
the ECHR: Public Interest Considerations’ into The Nationality, Immigration and Asylum 
Act 20025 in an attempt to reduce the influence of respect for private and family life ‘where a 
                                                                                                                                                        
* I am grateful to Jim Allan, Tom Poole, Peter Shears, James Sweeney, Paul Wragg, James 
Young and the editor and his anonymous reviewers for their comments. I am also grateful to 
Barry O’Leary for other help. I stress that I am solely responsible for the views expressed in 
this paper. 
1 c 22. The Act received the Royal Assent on 14 May 2014. What is now section 19 was 
variously clauses 14 or 18 of the Bill. 
2 Joint Committee on Human Rights, Legislative Scrutiny: Immigration Bill (Second Report) 
HL Paper 142/HC 1120 (2013-14) paras 100-111. This report was published on 3 March 
2014. 
3 Joint Committee on Human Rights, Legislative Scrutiny: Immigration Bill HL Paper 
102/HC 935 (2013-14) paras 54-63. 
4 Joint Committee on Human Rights, fn 2 above, para 109 (referring to Joint Committee on 
Human Rights, fn 3 above, para 60). The Lords Constitution Committee described this as a 
‘significant’ ‘constitutional innovation’: Select Committee on the Constitution, Immigration 
Bill HL Paper 148 (2013-14) paras 9, 18. It is, of course, the precise method of section 19 that 
may be unprecedented. For the Joint Committee’s criticism of the efforts of a previous 
government to achieve a comparable shift in asylum and immigration adjudication see Joint 
Committee on Human Rights, Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc) Bill HL 
Paper 35/HC 304 (2003-04) paras 52-76. 




court or tribunal is required to determine whether a decision made under the Immigration 
Acts breaches … Article 8’.6 Much of Part 5A lists these public interest considerations in an 
unusual but essentially unproblematic manner.7 But the new sub-sections 117B(4) and (5) 
instruct a court or tribunal to give ‘little weight’ to ‘a private life, or a relationship formed 
with a qualifying partner, that is established by a person at a time when a person is in the 
United Kingdom unlawfully’ or to ‘a private life established by a person at a time when the 
person’s immigration status is precarious’. There can be no doubt that that these sub-sections, 
regardless of the declaration of compatibility8 and the title of Part 5A,9 do not merely tell a 
court or tribunal what considerations to take into account but instruct them how to balance 
those considerations against the Art 8(1) right, despite an evasive Government denial that this 
is the case.10 The Joint Committee proposed amendments to the Immigration Bill intended to 
                                                                                                                                                        
6 s 117A(1). 
7 ss 117A(2)-(3), 117B(1)-(3).  
8 Immigration Bill (as introduced) HC Bill 110 (2013-14). 
The Act is the primary legislation which the Home Secretary has long maintained 
would follow if 2012 changes to the Immigration Rules did not have ‘the intended effect’ of 
making ‘the Courts … have regard’ to ‘Government’s [and] Parliament’s view of how the 
balance should be struck between the public interest and individuals’ rights under Article 8’: 
Mrs Theresa May, Home Secretary, Letter to Dr Hywel Francis MP, Chair of the Joint 
Human Rights Committee (4 December 2012) 
http://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/joint-select/human-rights-
committee/other-scrutiny-work/immigration-rules/ The Government took enormous pains to 
state that these changes to these quasi-legislative rules were compatible: Home Office, 
Immigration Rules on Family and Private Life (HC 194): Grounds Of Compatibility With 
Article 8 Of The European Convention On Human Rights (13 June 2012) 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/immigration-rules-on-family-and-private-life-
hc-194  
9 The Immigration Bill’s Explanatory Notes said only that ‘the new section 117B lists the 
public interest considerations which are applicable in all cases’: HC Bill 110-EN (2013-14) 
para 85 and HL Bill 84-EN (2013-14) para 93. 
10 Government Response to the Joint Committee on Human Rights, Eighth Report of Session 
2013–14, para 14: http://www.parliament.uk/documents/joint-
committees/humanrights/Govt_response_re_Immigration_Bill.pdf As the Joint Committee 
points out, fn 2 above, para 110, this response simply does not address its concern. A Home 
Office reply to the Constitution Committee merely referred to the Lords Committee Stage 




nullify this instruction,11 but sub-sections 117B(4) and (5) passed into law completely intact. 
An amendment moved by Lord Pannick literally removing these sub-sections was withdrawn 
after the debate it was intended to provoke had taken place.12  
 The Government has taken this remarkable and troubling step because it is very 
concerned that there is so excessive a number of successful appeals against deportation or 
removal on Art 8 grounds13 that a ‘situation’ prevails in which ‘those claiming the right to … 
remain in the UK on the basis of ECHR Article 8 … do so essentially without regard to the 
Immigration Rules’.14 One would say that the seriousness of the Government’s concern about 
this situation cannot be exaggerated were it not that many of its public pronouncements about 
it, especially by the Home Secretary, do in fact use the most exaggerated language. When 
moving his amendment, Lord Pannick referred15 to a newspaper article in which the Home 
Secretary said that she would ‘fight any judge’16 who opposed the policy which lies behind 
Part 5A. Lord Pannick professed not to see what the fuss was about:  
The … problem I have with [what is now section 19] which motivated [this 
amendment] is whether there really is a mischief that needs to be addressed … a 
very serious allegation has been made against the judiciary. I do not speak for the 
judiciary, but I simply cannot understand the factual premise for [section 19], and 
                                                                                                                                                        
Information, Letter to Baroness Jay, Chairman of the Select Committee on the Constitution 
(14 March 2014): http://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/lords-
select/constitution-committee/  
11 Joint Committee on Human Rights, fn 2 above, para 111. 
12 HL Deb (2013-14) vol 752 cols 1391-1404 (5 March 2014). 
13 Home Office, Impact Assessment of Reforming Immigration Appeal Rights, IAHO0096 (1 
October 2013). The Home Office is similarly concerned about entry decisions. 
14 Home Office, Statement of Intent: Family Migration (June 2012) para 7. 
15 HL Deb (2013-14) vol 752 col 1392 (5 March 2014). 
16 T May, ‘It’s My Job to Deport Foreigners Who Commit Serious Crime and I’ll Fight Any 






nor, if I may say so, can anyone else practising in this field to whom I have 
spoken.17 
 Lord Pannick no doubt accurately describes his own position and that of his learned 
colleagues. But this does not, in my opinion, point to want of a mischief addressed by section 
19. Rather it points to the want of an appreciation of that mischief by those subscribing to 
what I have in this journal previously called the ‘HRA jurisprudence’,18 even though that 
mischief amounts to a challenge to sovereignty of Parliament, and through this democratic 
policy-making, in immigration matters. This want of appreciation is the latest contribution of 
the HRA jurisprudence to the unconstructive polarisation of views about the operation of the 
Human Rights Act 199819 which it is the purpose of this paper to discuss. 
 Lord Pannick also made reference to the most famous of the expressions of the 
Government’s concern,20 the Home Secretary’s speech at the 2011 Conservative Party 
conference in which she claimed that the ‘misinterpretation’ of Art 8 which prevents ‘the 
deportation of people who shouldn’t be here’ was one of the reasons she was ‘of the view that 
the Human Rights Act must go’.21 This speech received enormous public attention, 
particularly in respect of an example she gave of such misinterpretation, that of an ‘illegal 
immigrant who cannot be deported because – and I am not making this up – he had a pet 
                                                                                                                                                        
17 HL Deb (2013-14) vol 752 col 1392 (5 March 2014). 
18 D Campbell, ‘The Threat of Terror and the Plausibility of Positivism’ [2009] Public Law 
501, 502. 
19 c 42. 
20 HL Deb (2013-14) vol 752 col 1392 (5 May 2014). The Lords Committee also referred to 
this case: fn 4 above, para 13. Just after the Home Secretary’s  speech, Lord Pannick had 
joked that her cat example ‘had turned out to be a shaggy dog story’: A Wagner, ‘The 
Lessons of Shaggy Dogs and Catgate’ (5 October 2011) UK Human Rights Blog 
http://ukhumanrightsblog.com/2011/10/05/the-lessons-and-shaggy-dogs-and-catgate/  





cat’.22 The Home Secretary was not, indeed, entirely making it up. She had actual Asylum 
and Immigration Tribunal proceedings somewhere in mind, though, as we shall see, they 
involved neither deportation nor an illegal entrant,23 and that the appellant had a pet cat 
cannot remotely be regarded as the ground for his successful challenge to his removal. It is 
necessary to say that, though when considered as an exercise in seeking cheap political 
advantage, the Home Secretary’s use of this example was ultimately very effective,24 when 
considered as a responsible contribution by the holder of high office to the democratic 
deliberation of a difficult issue, it is impossible to justify.  
 But nor is it possible to justify the line taken by Lord Pannick. Though his reference to 
the Home Secretary’s example of the cat was calculated to undermine the case for section 19, 
Lord Pannick left his criticism of that example implicit. But his thinking was recently given 
clear expression in the attempt by Ms Michelle Lafferty, a lawyer in the Registry of the 
European Court of Human Rights writing in her personal capacity, to dispel certain ‘myths’ 
which are ‘a source of regret and disappointment to those who support the European Court of 
Human Rights and to those who work within its walls’.25 The very first example Ms Lafferty 
gives of the Court’s judgments being ‘often misrepresented in the United Kingdom’ is 
‘Catgate’. Citing characteristic HRA jurisprudence responses to this episode which claim that 
                                                                                                                                                        
22 ibid. 
23 As defined by the Immigration Act 1971 (c 77) s 33 (as amended). 
24 Though conference received the speech with great enthusiasm, an awkwardness arose 
when the then Justice Secretary, Mr Kenneth Clarke, immediately reacted to the cat example 
with incredulity and accused the Home Secretary of extreme gullibility: Anon, ‘Clarke Hits 
Out at “Childish Remarks”’ (6 October 2011) Nottingham Post: 
http://www.nottinghampost.com/Clarke-hits-childish-remarks/story-13490799-
detail/story.html  
25 M Lafferty, ‘The Strasbourg Court and the UK: Dispelling the Myths’ (2014) 18 




‘the cat had nothing to do with the failure to deport’,26 Ms Lafferty herself claims that ‘In 
fact, the Home Office lost the case because it failed to follow its own guidance’.27 
  This account of the case manages to accomplish what one would have thought very 
difficult by being actually less accurate than the Home Secretary’s. Though we shall see that 
the cat featured only in a most unusual way in the appeal, it played a very important role in 
the original Tribunal determination, and that it did so gives rise to a perfectly legitimate 
concern, not for our purposes about immigration policy, but about the way that a decision 
about removal was reached in effective disregard of the relevant domestic legislation and, I 
will argue, of Art 8. 
 One might understandably think that Catgate, and certainly much public discussion of 
it, was rather foolish and, especially as Asylum and Immigration Tribunal proceedings cannot 
normally be thought to be able bear the weight of constitutional argument I am about to place 
upon them, perhaps it is now best just to put the episode behind us. It is not, in truth, any 
jurisprudential quality that should draw our attention to these proceedings, which we shall see 
were in a strong sense ramshackle, though it is very important that they did, in fact, in the end 
give effect to the law as it was then being expressed by the House of Lords. The significance 
of Catgate lies in the continuing inability of those committed to the HRA jurisprudence such 
as Lord Pannick and Ms Lafferty to see what is wrong with the judicial attitude displayed in 
that episode. A proper examination of Catgate shows it to turn on a use of proportionality 
                                                                                                                                                        
26 A Wagner, ‘Cat Had Nothing to Do with Failure to Deport Man’ (4 October 2011) UK 
Human Rights Blog: http://ukhumanrightsblog.com/2011/10/04/cat-had-nothing-to-do-with-
failure-to-deport-man/ When giving evidence about the work of the UK Human Rights Blog 
of which he is an editor to the Leveson inquiry, Mr Wagner referred to Catgate as ‘the most 
famous example of the misrepresentation of human rights … perhaps ever’: A Wagner, 
Witness Statement to the Leveson Inquiry into the the Culture, Practice and Ethics of the 
Press (7 February 2012) para 32(a): 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20140122145147/http://www.levesoninquiry.org.u
k/evidence/?witness=adam-wagner Many others, including some of the most distinguished 
contributors to the HRA jurisprudence, took essentially Mr Wagner’s line.  




arguments by courts and tribunals which in effect strikes down legislation in just the way that 
the Human Rights Act is not meant to do, and it is this that has brought the Government to 
the point where sub-sections 117B(4) and (5) seem sensible. That this is the case and that it is 
impossible to approve of the innovation which would be brought about by these sub-sections 
leaves the future of the Human Rights Act in general uncertain and even bleak. The purpose 
of this article is to show that the HRA jurisprudence bears an aliquot part, and in my opinion 
the principal part, of the responsibility for this state of affairs. 
 
The facts of Catgate 
Catgate arose from a successful 2008 challenge to removal, under procedures which have 
since considerably changed but the changes to which need not be discussed here, heard by 
Immigration Judge Devittie28 and upheld by Senior Immigration Judge Gleeson.29 The 
appellant, one Sr Camilio Renzo Soria, a Bolivian national, had entered the UK on 7 July 
2002 as an architecture student, with permission to remain until 30 November 2004. He 
unlawfully remained in the UK after the expiration of his student visa in part because earlier 
in 2004 he had entered into an intimate relationship with Mr Frank Trew, a British national, 
living in a rented flat with Mr Trew from either later in 2004 or from 2005. On 21 February 
                                                                                                                                                        
28 Asylum and Immigration Tribunal, IA/14578/2008, 24 September 2008, Immigration 
Judge Devittie. I believe that no authorised transcript of this decision is publicly available. A 
copy is available from the author and at Anon, ‘Catgate: The Mail Wrong to Claim Cat Was 
“Key Reason” in Judgment’ (6 October 2011) Full Fact 
https://fullfact.org/blog/catgate_catflap_Daily_Mail_imigrant_bolivian_cat_deportation-3018 
The name of the appellant (and, not entirely consistently, also of Maya the cat!) is 
suppressed. My understanding of the facts is based on those given in this determination and 
its reconsideration, supplemented by various media accounts. The nature of the reports of 
these deliberations and the incompleteness of, and the inconsistency between, even the better 
of those accounts make it impossible to be completely confident about all those facts. 
29 Asylum and Immigration Tribunal IA/14578/2008, 1 December 2008, Senior Immigration 
Judge Gleeson, promulgated 10 December 2008. This decision may be found on the IAT/AIT 





2007 Sr Soria effectively brought himself to the attention of the immigration authorities, 
which do not appear to have previously actively pursued him, by being caught shoplifting a 
figurine cat from a department store. He then brought an application for leave to remain 
which was refused and directions for his removal were made.  
 In her conference speech the Home Secretary focused on failures to deport foreign 
nationals who had committed serious offences, and it would be understandable if those 
hearing that speech believed the ‘illegal immigrant who … had a pet cat’ to be such a 
criminal, as indeed many did. Referring to the matter as one of deportation will have 
encouraged this misunderstanding. Deportation is a term which has no clear legal definition 
but which, whatever may previously have been the case,30 then,31 as now, connoted the 
expulsion of a seriously undesirable foreign national coupled with a prohibition on re-entry. 
But Sr Soria was not a foreign criminal of the sort which section 117C specifically addresses. 
He was not even charged with an offence in connection with his shoplifting, but any offence 
of which he could possibly have been convicted would not have been serious enough either to 
make his deportation under the then prevailing law likely or to now bring him within the 
definition of a foreign criminal under sub-section 117D(2) of the new Act. His removal was 
sought because he was an over-stayer whose presence was in breach of the terms of his entry. 
Sub-sections 117B(4) and (5) address cases like Mr Soria’s, which seems to be four square 
with sub-section 117B(4)(b).32  
                                                                                                                                                        
30 Immigration Act 1971 (c 77) s 3(5)(a) (as originally passed). 
31 Immigration Act 1971 s 3(5)(a) (as amended by the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 (c 
33) s 169(1), Sched 14 para 44(2)). 
32 Sr Soria’s immigration status was described as both ‘unlawful’ and as ‘precarious’ by 
Judge Devittie (fn 28 above, paras [3], [11]) but surely it was unlawful. His family life 
argument would therefore now fall under s 117B(4)(b). But not all family life arguments 
would do so, and a family life argument does not appear to be captured at all by s 117B(5). 




 Immediately after the Home Secretary had made her speech, the Judicial 
Communications Office reissued a press statement which the Judicial Office had previously 
issued after the determination by Judge Gleeson was promulgated. It read: 
This was a case in which the Home Office conceded that they had mistakenly 
failed to apply their own policy - applying at that time to that appellant - for 
dealing with unmarried partners of people settled in the UK. That was the basis 
for the decision to uphold the original tribunal decision - the cat had nothing to do 
with the decision.33 
This was very widely seized on as evidence that the cat played no role in the determination 
and that the Home Secretary had been incompetent or even of dubious honesty.34 But this 
statement proved to be even more misleading than the Home Secretary’s speech. It referred 
only to Judge Gleeson’s determination, which did indeed focus on the application of guidance 
to Sr Soria’s case. However, not only is this, with respect, a most puzzling decision, but it is 
not the decision on which debate needs to concentrate. 
 The two grounds on which the Secretary of State was granted reconsideration before 
Judge Gleeson were that Judge Devittie had placed ‘inappropriate weight … on the appellant 
having to leave behind not only his partner but also their joint cat’, and that in reaching his 
determination he had applied guidance which had been withdrawn some months prior to the 
hearing.35 Judge Gleeson held that under transitional provisions the guidance should have 
                                                                                                                                                        
33 P Henley, ‘Theresa May in Deportation Cat Flap’ (4 October 2011) BBC News England: 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-15174254 I am obliged to quote from this source (the 
text of which is corroborated by innumerable other media sources) because I have been 
unable to locate an official version of this statement (it is not in the Judicial Communications 
Office’s website archive) or to obtain definitive official answers to a number of questions 
about its source. I nevertheless must discuss this statement because it was absolutely central 
to Catgate.  
34 D Allen Green, ‘Theresa May Gets It Wrong About a Cat: The Home Secretary’s 
Conference Speech Shows that She Does Not Know What Her Own Department Is Doing’ (4 
October 2011) New Statesman: http://www.newstatesman.com/blogs/david-allen-
green/2011/10/home-secretary-cat-immigration  




been applied,36 and seems to have found for Sr Soria for this reason. But this does not, with 
respect, give her decision any sound footing. For, amidst confusion about this guidance which 
the case as reported does not eliminate, it does emerge that the guidance had been applied at 
the first hearing,37 with the Secretary of State in part arguing on this basis!38 As Sr Soria 
suffered no prejudice in respect of the guidance, that the Secretary of State seems to have got 
into a muddle about it, the nature of which the case as reported leaves entirely unclear, is a 
mere technicality.39 
 The substantive point Judge Gleeson had to decide was about the weight given to 
having the pet cat, but she does not discuss this at all, and this leaves her decision without any 
substantive basis whatsoever. As reported, that decision is, with respect but one has to say, 
ramshackle. Her only comment on the cat was a, with respect, unwise attempt at a joke with 
which she saw fit to conclude her determination: ‘The Immigration Judge’s determination is 
upheld and the cat [name suppressed] need no longer fear having to adapt to Bolivian 
mice’.40 This overwhelmed proper consideration of her decision and led to some public 
confusion about whether her thinking had turned on the rights of the cat!41 But the sympathy 
                                                                                                                                                        
36 ibid, para [5]. The guidance had been withdrawn on 24 April 2008.  
37 Immigration Judge Devittie, fn 28 above, para [17]. 
38 ibid, para [3]. The Secretary of State’s manner of argument before Judge Devittie and, even 
more, before Judge Gleeson is, as reported, incomprehensible.  
39 Senior Immigration Judge Gleeson, fn 29 above, para [6] (my emphasis): ‘Had the 
transitional provisions been properly applied, the Immigration Judge would have been 
entitled to allow the appeal under DP3/96 as he had in fact done’.  
40 ibid, para [7]. 
41 One would say that discussion of things like this has no place in this journal, save that 
Judge Devittie’s decision as reported leads one to think that, scarcely credibly, the Secretary 
of State seems to have considered whether ‘the appellant’s removal would have any 
consequences for the appellant’s family life of Maya [sic]’ for ‘she is considered to be able to 
adapt to life abroad’: Immigration Judge Devittie, fn 28 above, para [14]. Perhaps the best 
interpretation of this is that it was itself a joke intended to ridicule the submission about the 
cat. Mr Barry O’Leary, of Wesley Gryck Solicitors LLP, who acted for Sr Soria, issued his 




one has with what one imagines were Judge Gleeson’s feelings when she saw her joke go so 
badly wrong does not give any greater weight to her decision as such. It is as if merely 
getting into some purely technical muddle about the guidance was enough for the Secretary 
of State to fail overall, and though it seems that the Secretary accepted this at the 
reconsideration hearing,42 this is a non sequitur which left the only point of substance to be 
considered in the appeal untouched, indeed entirely unexamined. And this is of real 
significance because the cat was in fact an important ground of the original determination.43 
The defences that have been made of Catgate based on stressing the technical aspect of the 
determination entirely obfuscate the point of importance both for that determination and more 
widely. 
 
The reasoning in Catgate 
Being unarguably an over-stayer, Sr Soria mounted an Art 8(1) family life argument against 
removal based on establishing that he was ‘the unmarried partner of a person present and 
                                                                                                                                                        
substantially but not completely reproduced in Allen Green, fn 34 above. Mr O’Leary traces 
all this to a ‘rather mischievous’ part of the letter of refusal of Sr Soria’s application for leave 
to remain. Mr O’Leary instructed Mr Ronan Toal of Garden Court Chambers, and in a press 
interview Mr Toal also put forward this explanation of this particular piece of nonsense: P 
Curtis, ‘Reality Check: Can Owning a Cat be Grounds for Appeal Against Deportation?’ (4 
October 2011) The Guardian http://www.theguardian.com/politics/reality-check-with-polly-
curtis/2011/oct/04/reality-check-cat-theresa-may 
42 Senior Immigration Judge Gleeson, fn 29 above, para [6]. In his press release, fn 41 above, 
Mr O’Leary more clearly says that this was the case.  
43 Although I am unaware of any media account which properly related the two Tribunal 
findings, the correct significance of the cat was not entirely unappreciated by the media at the 
time of the Home Secretary’s speech: T Whitehead and R Alleyne, ‘Discovered, the Real Cat 
that Made Tory Fur Fly’ (5 October 2011) Daily Telegraph: 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/conservative/8809836/Discovered-the-real-cat-that-
made-Tory-fur-fly.html and T Whitehead et al, ‘Immigrant in Pet Row was Shoplifter’ (6 






settled in the United Kingdom’.44 Apart from the oral evidence of Sr Soria and Mr Trew and 
photographs and similar evidence of their relationship,45 their friends and Mr Trew’s siblings 
gave witness statements and provided letters of support, and another friend gave oral 
evidence. Judge Devittie regarded this as ‘credible evidence’ ‘that the appellant and his 
unmarried partner have established family life’, indeed had ‘lived together for about four 
years’, and he was ‘satisfied therefore that the appellant’s removal would constitute 
interference with his family life’.46 
 Having established the existence of family life, Judge Devittie turned to the second 
stage of the effectively two-stage process of reasoning47 in Art 8 immigration deliberations 
and asked whether removal was proportionate, and in particular ‘whether the appellant’s 
removal would have sufficiently serious consequences to render his removal disproportionate 
having regard to the public interest in the removal of persons whose residence in the United 
Kingdom is unlawful’.48 This goes to the fourth of the questions that the Constitution 
Committee notes a court (or tribunal) is required to ask when determining proportionality in 
immigration cases: ‘whether a fair balance has been struck between the rights of the 
individual and the interests of the community’.49 
 It is uncontroversial that removal may be justified as pursuant to an aim recognised 
under Art 8(2), and Judge Devittie made explicit mention of ‘legitimate policy considerations 
                                                                                                                                                        
44 Immigration Judge Devittie, fn 28 above, para [1]. 
45 There was evidence of a joint bank account (ibid, para [6]), but this is hard to understand as 
surely any such account would have had to be created by serious criminal fraud.  
46 ibid, paras [6], [7], [17]. 
47 I put to one side the shortcomings of this approach, though they are particularly clearly 
manifested in Catgate: G Webber, The Negotiable Constitution (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press 2010) 56. 
48 ibid, para [11]. 
49 Select Committee on the Constitution, fn 4 above, para 10. See Huang v Secretary of State 




mainly to do with deterrence on which rest the requirement that persons in the appellant’s 
position be required to make out of country applications’.50 He was here referring to the 
important fact that this was not a deportation case. After removal, Sr Soria would have been 
at liberty to make an out of country application to enter on the basis of his intimate 
relationship with Mr Trew, and Mr Trew ‘certainly [had] the financial means to sponsor an 
application for re-entry’.51 The main reason given for the withdrawal of the guidance which 
was the subject of Judge Gleeson’s determination was that the Government had come to the 
view that that guidance was overly generous to those in Sr Soria’s situation by comparison to 
those who made out of country applications.52 
 That guidance gave particular weight to the presence of dependent children who should 
not themselves be removed as a reason not to allow removal.53 At its core, this is 
uncontroversial and sub-section (6) of section 117B effectively prohibits removal in these 
circumstances. However, despite the picture of heterosexual connubial bliss imaginatively 
painted in a number of accounts of the case sympathetic to Sr Soria,54 in the circumstances of 
homosexual partners who were childless when they met and whose relationship could not be 
formalised because one of them was in the UK unlawfully, there could not (outside of far-
                                                                                                                                                        
50 Immigration Judge Devittie, fn 28 above, para [17]. 
51 ibid. 
52 Mr Liam Byrne, Minister for Borders and Immigration, HC Deb (2007-8) vol 474 cols 
109-110WS (24 April 2008). 
53 Enforcement Policy Group, Marriage Policy DP3/96 (13 March 1996), para 7. This 
guidance may be found by searching the National Archives by its reference number: 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/search/?lang=en&noneW=&format=all&site=&sea
rch_type=category&x=31&y=12&exactW=&where=text&query=DP3%2F96&x=0&y=0  
54 J Welch, ‘Theresa May’s Twisted Tale of a Bolivian’s Cat’ (4 October 2011) 
theguardian.com: http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2011/oct/04/theresa-may-cat-
human-rights-act ‘The appellant’s … right to remain in this country had nothing to do with 
his cat. For four years before his case came before the immigration courts the man lived with 
a British woman. They did all those coupley things: bought crockery, went out clubbing, got 
a pet cat. When it came to wanting to regularise the man’s right to stay in this country – and 
anticipating immigration officials’ inevitable scepticism – the shared cat was one of a number 




fetched speculation) be any dependent children. The guidance also gave particular weight to 
its being ‘unreasonable to expect a settled spouse to accompany his/her spouse on removal’,55 
and it was found that Mr Trew’s participation in arrangements with his siblings for the 
support of their father who was in deteriorating health made such an expectation 
unreasonable.56 
 As the matter is reported, it was to strengthen his claim to have an Art 8(1) family life 
that the appellant drew attention to Maya the cat,57 which a friend had given him and Mr 
Trew in 2005.58 This was ingenious pleading which met with a very warm reception indeed. 
Judge Devittie saw fit to undertake a substantial review of the position in the Canadian and 
US laws of tort which he claimed evidenced: 
an increasing recognition of the significance that pets occupy in family life and of 
the potentially serious emotional consequences pet owners may suffer when some 
unhappy event terminates the bond they have with a pet [and a movement] away 
from the legal view that animals are mere chattels, to a recognition that they play 
an important role in the lives of their owners and that the loss of a pet has a 
significant emotional impact on its owner.59  
On the strength of this, Judge Devittie was able to conclude that ‘The evidence concerning 
the joint acquisition of Maya by the appellant and his partner reinforces my conclusion on 
[sic] the strength and quality of the family life that appellant and his partner enjoy’.60 
 Nothing can more clearly show that one’s evaluation of evidence can be extremely 
influenced by one’s predispositions than the polarisation of opinion about Judge Devittie’s 
                                                                                                                                                        
55 Marriage Policy, fn 53 above, para 5(b). 
56 Immigration Judge Devittie, fn 28 above, paras [4b], [12]. 
57 In his press release, fn 41 above, Mr O’Leary clearly said that Sr Soria’s and Mr Trew’s 
‘ownership of a cat was just one detail amongst many given to demonstrate the genuine 
nature of their relationship’ and this was repeated by Mr Toal in his press interview: Curtis, 
fn 41 above. 
58 Immigration Judge Devittie, fn 28 above, paras [4b], [14]. 





determination. But if there is to be any expansion of the consensus that is necessary to make 
productive discussion of policy possible, the HRA jurisprudence has to acknowledge that the 
cat was not irrelevant to the substance of Sr Soria’s case but played an important part in it. It 
was not even just the case ‘that the cat was only mentioned in passing’.61 The appellant did 
raise the ownership of the cat in support of his argument and Judge Devittie did make a 
substantial and striking effort to give the ownership of pets an important weight in cases like 
Sr Soria’s.62  
 Because the last thing this topic needs is the use of inflammatory words in its 
discussion, I am denied the use of the vocabulary appropriate to express my own opinion of 
this argument by the appellant and, even more, its reception by Judge Devittie. It is enough to 
say that it is all so questionable that, in the end, ‘the thrust of the point the Home Secretary 
was seeking to make … was unquestionably correct’.63 Judge Devittie used the cat as part of 
a proportionality argument that was not, with all respect, a balancing within the confines of 
the domestic legislation (or even the Convention) but an attempt to justify effective disregard 
of that legislation. And the crucial point is that, nevertheless, his reasoning was in an 
important sense perfectly sound. He reached his determination after reviewing three House of 
Lords cases64 on deportation and removal,65 of which the then recently decided66 but 
                                                                                                                                                        
61 Curtis, fn 41 above. Whilst the determination to which she refers gave an answer to her 
question the opposite of the one she thought, Ms Curtis was unusual amongst media 
commentators in at least identifying the right proceedings (and essentially correctly 
conveying the significance of the cat).  
62 The only media account of which I am aware which makes both of these two crucial points 
is D Barrett, ‘Bolivian “Cat-gate” Immigrant Cashes In On Tory Conference Fame’ (8 
October 2011) Daily Telegraph: 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/immigration/8815428/Bolivian-cat-gate-
immigrant-cashes-in-on-Tory-conference-fame.html  
63 J Fisher, Rescuing Human Rights (London: Henry Jackson Society 2012) 38.  
64 Although he wrongly located it in the judgment of Laws LJ when it actually is dicta of 
Lord Bingham, Judge Devittie found his principal instruction ‘on the spirit that lies behind 




subsequently extremely influential Chikwamba was the most closely analogous to Sr Soria’s 
case. In that case, an appeal against removal was upheld in these terms by Lord Scott: 
Not many would dispute, and I do not, that would-be immigrants who desire to 
remain permanently in this country should apply for permission to do so before 
coming here. It is the Government's policy that that should be so and that a failed 
asylum seeker should return, or be returned, to his or her country and make from 
there any applications for the right to reside in this country that he or she desires 
to make. But policies that involve people cannot be, and should not be allowed to 
become, rigid inflexible rules. The bureaucracy of which Kafka wrote cannot be 
allowed to take root in this country and the courts must see that it does not … The 
claimant, in her appeal, relies on Article 8 of the Convention and, for my part, I 
regard the decisions of the lower courts as clearly unreasonable and 
disproportionate. It is, or ought to be, accepted that the claimant's husband cannot 
be expected to return to Zimbabwe, that the claimant cannot be expected to leave 
her child behind if she is returned to Zimbabwe and that if the claimant were to be 
returned to Zimbabwe she would have every prospect of succeeding in an 
application made there for permission to re-enter and remain in this country with 
her husband. So what on earth is the point of sending her back? Why cannot her 
application simply be made here? The only answer given on behalf of the 
Secretary of State is that Government policy requires that she return and make her 
application from Zimbabwe. This is elevating policy to dogma. Kafka would have 
enjoyed it.67 
 Conscious myself of the Kafkaesque quality of much administrative law,68 I should 
hope to be the last to deny the possibility that Lord Scott’s criticism of Government policy 
may well be right (though I do not think so). But it cannot be useful to deny that Chikwamba 
was part of what might be called a judicial debate about the merits of that policy.69 The 
                                                                                                                                                        
of the interpretation of proportionality generally: Huang v Secretary of State for the Home 
Office, fn 49 above, para [18].  
65 Immigration Judge Devittie, fn 28 above, paras [8]-[10].  
66 The Lords’ judgment was handed down on 25 June 2008. Chikwamba had received very 
considerable attention prior to that. The third case Judge Devittie discussed, Beoku-Betts v 
Secretary of State for the Home Department [2008] UKHL 39; [2009] 1 AC 115, was handed 
down on the same day.  
67 Chikwamba v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2008] UKHL 40; [2008] 1 
WLR 1420 at paras [4], [6]. 
68 D Campbell, ‘Gathering the Water: Abuse of Rights after the Recognition of Government 
Failure’ (2010) 7 The Journal Jurisprudence 487, 507-31. 
69 Chikwamba v Secretary of State for the Home Department, fn 67 above, paras [38]-[41]. 
The Lords reversed the Court of Appeal, which itself had affirmed the determination of the 




House of Lords, having made its own contribution to numerous judicial criticisms of the 
policy of removing persons who were unlawfully present and requiring them to make out of 
country applications, then blatantly refused to enforce that policy, even though the 
Government was so far committed to it as to go to the Lords to defend it. Now, Chikwamba 
was itself an asylum case involving a possibly dangerous country and the interests of a child. 
But the decision on those facts was based on the normalisation of disregard of a clear 
legislative intent which had failed to find favour in the judicial debate,70 and it was surely 
inevitable that we would get Catgate, the removal to a perfectly safe country of a student 
over-stayer whose family life was of so ordinary a sort that he believed that pleading that he 
had a cat would strengthen his Art 8(1) argument. I believe that some consciousness of the 
democratic indefensibility of such disregard has shaped the denial of the role of the cat that 
characterises the HRA jurisprudence’s reaction to Catgate, and Judge Devittie’s animal 
doctrine has not flourished; indeed, I can find no trace of it in subsequent cases. 
 
Immigration law, proportionality and sovereignty of Parliament 
The primary legislation under which Sr Soria might have been removed is the Immigration 
and Asylum Act 1999 s 10(1)(a), which provides that: ‘A person who is not a British citizen 
may be removed from the United Kingdom, in accordance with directions given by an 
immigration officer, if … having only a limited leave to enter or remain, he does not observe 
                                                                                                                                                        
down by Auld LJ is, I submit, an exemplary account of the Government’s policy and of 
authority critical but ultimately appropriately deferential to that policy: [2005] EWCA Civ 
1779. It is examined by the Lords at fn 67 above, paras [17]-[37]. 
70 Chikwamba v Secretary of State for the Home Department, fn 67 above, para [44] per Lord 
Browne: ‘I am far from suggesting that the Secretary of State should routinely apply the 
policy [of requiring an out of country application] in all but exceptional cases. Rather it 
seems to me that only comparatively rarely, certainly in family cases involving children, 
should an Article 8 appeal be dismissed on the basis that it would be proportionate and more 




a condition attached to the leave or remains beyond the time limited by the leave’.71 This 
provision was, one would have thought it indisputable to say, passed with the intention that it 
would lead to the removal of those broadly in Sr Soria’s position, despite those in that 
position obviously having a family life. Referring to the relevant Immigration Rule, the 
guidance about which there was such confusion explicitly72 states that: ‘the fact that an 
offender is married to a person settled here does not give him/her any right to remain under 
the Rules’.73 The exercise of the s 10 power, and previous similar powers under the 
Immigration Acts,74 has always had to be read subject to Art 8. But, in addition to the simple, 
and simply enormous, growth in immigration proceedings,75 what has changed since the 
statutory recognition that the Human Rights Act 1998 s 6 applies to immigration decisions76 
is that ‘the traditional common law grounds of review’77 have increasingly been supplanted 
by review on the basis of proportionality, and taxing courts and tribunals with determining ‘a 
fair balance between the rights of the individual and the interests of the community’78 has 
been made central to removal decisions. The expanding scope of the concept of 
proportionality has acutely posed the problem, recognised by the open-minded even when 
                                                                                                                                                        
71 s 10 will be replaced by Immigration Act 2014 s 1 when that section is brought into force. 
Sr Soria would fall under s 1(1). 
72 Subject to changes in the understanding of ‘marriage’ which need not be pursued here. 
73 Marriage Policy, fn 53 above, para 4. Sr Soria’s challenge being based entirely on Art 8, it 
does not emerge why a ‘compassionate circumstances’ exception explicitly provided under 
this guidance was not pursued in his case.  
74 ie going back to the Immigration Act 1971: Interpretation Act 1978 (c 30) s 5, Sched 1 and 
UK Borders Act 2007 (c 30) s 61. 
75 Leaving aside the burden this has imposed on what is now HM Courts and Tribunals 
Service generally, a particular concern has arisen over the operation of judicial review, which 
is now dominated by asylum and immigration matters: Ministry of Justice, Judicial Review: 
Proposals for Reform, Cm 8515 (2012) para 29. 
76 Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 s 65(2)(c) (now Nationality, Immigration and Asylum 
Act 2002 s 84(1)(c); a new s 84 is to be substituted by the Immigration Act 2014 s 15(4)). 
77 Select Committee on the Constitution, fn 4 above, para 11. 




broadly in favour of the development,79 that ‘there is real difficulty in distinguishing this 
from a political question to be decided by the elected arm of government’.80  
 The importance of Catgate is that Judge Devittie’s determination was not an aberration 
but was in line with highly influential House of Lords cases such as Chikwamba. And I 
submit that this aspect of these decisions does most unfortunately give rise to the legitimate, 
indeed pressing, concern that those cases trespass on the executive and legislative functions 
because they take proportionality so far as to fail to respect sovereignty of Parliament in the 
way that ‘the common law grounds of review’ did.81 I do not want to examine in detail what 
now pass for the relevant legal principles. I am sufficiently Diceyan to claim that the 
fundamental issue raised by Catgate is the judicial attitude displayed in the Tribunal and 
Lords cases, which, far from attempting to uphold the comity between the branches of 
government which constitutes sovereignty of Parliament,82 is instead characterised by a want 
of appropriate deference to as perfectly clear a legislative intention as it is possible to 
conceive. 
                                                                                                                                                        
79 Huang v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] EWCA Civ 105; [2006] QB 1 
at para [43] per Laws LJ. 
80 R (Miranda) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2014] EWHC 255 (Admin) at 
para [40] per Laws LJ. 
81 eg finding The Social Security (Persons from Abroad) Miscellaneous Amendment 
Regulations 1996 SI 1996/30 (which ‘necessarily contemplate for some a life so destitute that 
to my mind no civilised nation can tolerate it’) to be ultra vires, Simon Brown LJ (in the 
majority in the Court of Appeal) maintained that ‘Primary legislation alone could in my 
judgement achieve that sorry state of affairs’: R v Secretary of State for Social Security ex p 
JCWI [1997] 1 WLR 275 (CA) at 292, 293. (The appallingly drafted and eventually repealed 
Asylum and Immigration Act 1996 (c 49) s 11 purported to do this). I am one of those who 
sees in this case, as Jonathan Sumption QC (as he then was) put it, ‘a vindication of the 
proper role of the courts’: ‘Judicial and Political Decision-making: The Uncertain Boundary’ 
[2011] Judicial Review 301, 307. 
82 The nature of the aspect of sovereignty of Parliament called into question by Catgate has 
recently been described in terms suitable to the position after the passage of the Human 
Rights Act in D Oliver, ‘Parliament and the Courts’ in A Horne et al (eds) Parliament and 




 Sr Soria did not face deportation. He (and Mr Trew) had for years deliberately and 
unlawfully flouted the conditions on which he obtained entry to the UK until, by committing 
a minor criminal act, he inadvertently made it no longer possible to continue to do so. His 
case for not then suffering removal as the consequence of this was of such weight that it 
seemed sensible and important to raise the fact that he and Mr Trew had a pet cat in support 
of it. Of course, ownership of pets is an important part of family life, but, again outside of far-
fetched speculation, such ownership can speak only to a perfectly ordinary family life, and 
Parliament obviously did not intend that a family life of this sort would make those in breach 
of the terms of their entry immune to removal. It is only when courts and tribunals have given 
the legislative intention such little weight that they effectively repeal the legislation that a 
family life of this sort can prevent removal. Though there was ‘no suggestion that [Sr Soria’s 
and Mr Trew’s] relationship has been contrived to prolong his stay’,83 one is perfectly 
entitled to ask, if Sr Soria could not be removed, who could?84 Judge Devittie’s deliberation 
effectively nullified the application to a perfectly common case of the Asylum and 
Immigration Act 1999 s 10(1)(a) and the (Rules and) guidance pursuant to it. It was in line 
with the House of Lords cases cited in it in doing so. 
 This deliberation also, I submit, did not respect the meaning of Art 8, though I do not 
wish to be thought to deny that this is a wholly controversial issue. Art 8(2), of course, 
specifies legitimate grounds ‘necessary in a democratic society’ for interference in what is an 
explicitly qualified right established under Art 8(1). I repeat the obvious that Sr Soria had a 
family life. But it was a family life of so ordinary a sort that ownership of a cat was pleaded 
as evidence of it, as indeed it was. But if so ordinary a family life trumps Art 8(2), despite 
                                                                                                                                                        
83 Sr Soria and Mr Trew entered into a civil partnership in October 2012 and continue to 
cohabit. 
84 An unreported decision of the Administrative Court is an example of where the line, in one 
instance at least, was subsequently drawn: R (on the applications of Kotecha and Das) v 




undeniable legislative intention to the contrary, then a proportionality argument is being used 
effectively to ignore Art 8(2). With proportionality understood in this way, the existence of a 
family life effectively quashes the legislative intention and Art 8(2) recognition of it. On the 
evidence of Catgate and the important cases Judge Devittie followed, it may well be fruitless 
of the Government to draw attention to the Art 8(2) grounds, though it does so, unusually and 
rather despairingly entering into a sort of debate about how important these grounds are in the 
very wording of Part 5A. For no amount of drawing attention will help if the courts and 
tribunals carry out the balancing exercise between Art 8(1) and Art 8(2) in the way it was 
done in Catgate. 
 I myself doubt that adjudication on the basis of proportionality can respect the 
democratic delimitation of the functions of the branches of government as well as the 
traditional grounds of review as they are given their shape within the doctrine of sovereignty 
of Parliament, and for this reason I believe Catgate was latent in the Human Rights Act. But, 
however this is, what Catgate – the House of Lords cases which inform it and the HRA 
jurisprudence denial of its unacceptability as well as the questionably competent decision-
making itself – certainly demonstrates is that the constitutional compromise which was the 
basis on which the Human Rights Act was passed will be unsustainable if the clear want of 
appropriate judicial deference displayed in this episode is not amended.  
 
Conclusion 
Sub-sections 117B(4) and (5) are a most worrying constitutional innovation in which the 
Government does indeed propose to trespass on the judicial function. But it is doing so 
because it sees no alternative way to address its concern that courts and tribunals have 
themselves trespassed on the executive and legislative functions in respect of immigration 




connection is, I submit, a clear instance of such trespass. The typical inability of both those 
wishing to criticise and those wishing to defend this case to give an accurate account of its 
facts or its ratio tell of a very worrying polarisation of debate over this issue. The Home 
Secretary used the influence of her office in a way which was bound to undermine 
democratic deliberation of the issues, and contributors to the HRA jurisprudence have very 
often failed to rise above the standard she set. They have sometimes done quite the other 
thing. I write this paper to criticise their stance.  
 Catgate is an example of the effective striking down of statute in an area where the 
vanguard politics of the HRA jurisprudence clash with the predominant public view. Of 
course, such a clash is implicit in the concept of human rights which stand against the 
despotic exercise of executive or legislative power even when endorsed by a majority of the 
electorate. But though it is therefore arguable that human rights law should give the judicial 
branch the power to strike down primary legislation, and though the aspiration to do so still 
informs much of the HRA jurisprudence, the Human Rights Act was passed on the basis that 
it did not do this. Whether it was ever going to be possible to sustain the implicit but vital 
compromise on the basis of proportionality was doubted when the Act was passed, and 
Catgate is another instance of its difficulty. 
 Sub-sections 117B(4) and (5) undeniably invite Art 8 challenge, but any successful 
challenge cannot but aggravate the current political difficulties. On the other hand, the Joint 
Committee’s and the Constitution Committee’s evident wish to avoid these difficulties by, for 
the moment, accepting the Government’s lack of frankness about what it is doing,85 also does 
not appear to be very promising.86 It is bound to unravel,87 and indeed is perhaps already 
                                                                                                                                                        
85 See fn 9 above and accompanying text. 
86 Joint Committee on Human Rights, fn 3 above, para 56 and Select Committee on the 




unravelling.88 The somewhat desperate and certainly very troubling nature of the step the 
Government is taking in sub-sections 117B(4) and (5) crystallises and will exacerbate a 
serious uncertainty about the operation of the Human Rights Act. The HRA jurisprudence 
must acknowledge that it is has played its own role in causing this to happen, in this case and 
others, if the Human Rights Act is to be put on a sound footing, or, indeed, to survive. 
                                                                                                                                                        
87 ibid, para 17. 
88 Joint Committee on Human Rights, fn 2 above, paras 109-11. 
